Rafael Rojas: “There are many ways to name the deteriorations that we are experiencing. Authoritarian drift is one of them”

-How should we read the results of the presidential election in Mexico last Sunday, June 2?

-The Mexican elections have been historic for several reasons: the first female president in the country’s history, Dr. Claudia Sheinbaum, has been elected, and her advantage over the opposition, led by another woman, Xóchitl Gálvez, is more than 30 points percentages. In fact, Sheinbaum has won more votes than López Obrador himself in 2018. This implies, at least, two things: on the one hand, a female presidential succession that will try to cover pending flanks of the previous government -ecology, feminism, insecurity- and, on the other, a disturbing legislative majority that would allow reform of the Constitution and deepening authoritarian elements such as militarization and control of the Judiciary.

-What is your view on the political outcome of the elections in relation to democratic transitions and promises in Mexican politics?

-It remains to be seen what would ultimately be the project for constitutional change promoted by Claudia Sheinbaum’s government in Congress. If it is the same one that López Obrador announced at the end of his mandate, where very sensitive electoral and judicial reforms would be made, there could be a definitive change in the political regime of the democratic transition at the end of the 20th century, which led to divided governments and political alternation. A hegemonic or majoritarian government, which has won democratic elections by an advantage, is not necessarily authoritarian. But it can transform its hegemony into an autocracy, if it sets its mind to it.

-How do you fit this result into the current Latin American and international context?

-My first observation is that geopolitics in Latin America must be understood from the various placements of world powers in the region. It is generally understood as a form of expansion or intervention by the United States and Western powers. But I think that a way more in line with the current multipolar system is to understand geopolitics as a field of expansion not only for the United States but also for Russia, China, India and other global powers. Especially in Latin America, the current moment is one of fragmentation or dissemination. Ten years ago, for example, you could grasp the tension between the Bolivarian bloc and the Lima Group. This is not like that. In fact, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the Organization of American States (OAS) are regional forums that are undergoing an evident withdrawal. The last CELAC summits have practically been meetings of the Bolivarian Alliance and fewer and fewer presidents attend the Ibero-American summits. This, which reflects the blurring of the geopolitical map of the region, has to do with the increasingly frequent diplomatic frictions or polarizations. We live in a time in which presidents are very protagonists in the exercise of foreign policy and diplomatic agendas. You only have to look at Javier Milei in Argentina, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela or Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico: they are very “vocal” presidents in the declarative dimension of foreign policies. This encourages the polarizations that exist at the ideological-political level.

-So, do these “vocal” leaders impact the quality of politics understood as a space for agreement…?

-Definitely. It is a topic that has increasing weight. We are talking about presidents who make politics from social networks. Diplomacy has ceased to be a matter of State and has become a mechanism for immediate and personalized expression. Such evident presence of presidents in the verbalization of their ideological preferences is a symptom of professional erosion in the exercise of foreign policies. This occurs in a world that is increasingly fragmented in its global hegemonies. Unlike the first stage of the post-Cold War, today the leaders of the region lack a single regulatory framework to exercise diplomacy. This disinhibits the verbal protagonism that is observed in many leaderships in Latin America and the Caribbean.

-Based on what you say, could it be said that we are facing the danger of a possible authoritarian drift in the region?

-Yeah. There are many ways to name the deteriorations we are experiencing. One of the most common is that: that we are facing multiple authoritarian drifts, which come from different ideological references. There are authors who speak of autocratization or progress towards illiberal democracies or competitive authoritarianisms. Actually, I see few definitive turns towards new autocracies in Latin America and the Caribbean. The ones that exist are those of Venezuela and Nicaragua. The Cuban case is different: it is not a democracy that becomes authoritarian, but rather a Cold War totalitarianism that adapts to the current retreat. In other countries I see authoritarian tendencies that do not fit into models of autocratization. Some political scientists speak of “hybrid” regimes, where democratic and authoritarian elements are mixed with very leading leaderships.

-Several years ago he wrote the book “The Air Republics”. Thinking about that work, should we redefine the notion of republicanism in Latin America?

-Yeah. In fact, today in Latin America and the Caribbean the crises of republics are more tangible and profound than those of democracies. With the new concentrations of power and the rhetorical narcissisms of the presidents, the republican framework of constitutional and political life is being abandoned. We experience an exhaustion of the civic models of republicanism: respect for institutions and laws and temperance manners, typical of republican leadership, are blurred. On both the left and the right, the references of republicanism have been replaced by those of populism.

Does this lead to a “low-intensity citizenry,” which participates less in the political debate?

-That is a very interesting point. We have citizens who vote regularly, who often respond to the plebiscitary mechanisms of power, but who are increasingly less civic-minded, less aware that what was previously called “public affairs” exists. And this occurs, among other things, because since the end of the 20th century, the citizens of the region are adopting a multicultural profile, which lacks a common articulation paradigm. This element intervenes and determines the crisis of republican civility in a context of increasing individual or group politicization through social networks.

-You have also written about the role of intellectuals. How do you analyze your current participation in public debate?

-Right now in Mexico we are witnessing an unprecedented confrontation between the President of the Republic and the intellectual field, with antecedents in some Latin American countries such as Cuba in the 70s and Venezuela in the 2000s. Argentina has also experienced it. When this happens it is because political actors emerge that compete with the place of enunciation of the intellectual field or try to occupy it. In the style of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, they dispute intellectual authority because they consider it an obstacle to the politicization of citizens. The deterioration of the liberal paradigm and the crisis of the republic are reflected very well in this media harassment of intellectuals.

Particular signs

Rafael Rojas (1965) is a Cuban historian and essayist, residing in Mexico. He is a professor at El Colegio de México and a full member of the Mexican Academy of History. He specializes in the intellectual and political history of Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries. Among his many books are The air republics. Utopia and disenchantment in the Latin American Revolution (Taurus, 2010) and The tree of revolutions. Ideas and power in Latin America (Turner, 2021). He is the Anagrama Essay Award.